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This paper considers how energy-related external costs change through time. It focuses on one of the key 
periods in the history of energy. After a period of declining coal prices and soaring consumption which 
fuelled the Second Industrial Revolution, the nineteenth century British economy was externalising the 
social costs of energy production and consumption on a massive scale. Rising from 25% in the 1820s, an 
estimated 60%-70% of the average social costs of coal were externalised in the 1880s, imposing damages 
close to 20% of GDP. The eventual decline in air pollution concentration (around 1900) occurred fifty 
years later than was broadly socially optimal. This experience highlights the evolution of the demand for 
and supply of environmental quality in the context of economic growth, and the nature of related market 
and government failures, implying the necessity for adaptation rather than encouraging mitigation. This 
experience may offer lessons for climate analysis and policy-making.   
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1  Introduction 
Economic growth can provide huge improvements in material well-being, while imposing a 
large burden on the environment and society (Mishan 1967). The large Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) literature has offered considerable empirical evidence on the relationship between economic 
growth and environmental pollution (Carson 2010). Implicit in much of the EKC debate is the view 
that environmental damage is just the price to pay at early stages of economic development – first, 
economies need to grow, in an environmentally damaging way, leaving markets and society to adapt 
to the damage, and, only later, clean-up. Yet, despite Mishan´s (1967) study, the damages have rarely 
been quantified (Jones 2011). 
Traditionally,  external  costs  have  been  measured  at  a  point-in-time.  The  vast  literature 
driven by ExternE was built upon attempts to capture the current value of energy or transport systems 
(Krewitt 2002, Bickel and Friedrich 2005). More recently, however, studies of the impact of climate 
change  have  developed  scenarios  in  which  these  future  damages  are  likely  to  vary  considerably 
through time (Tol 2002). After all, models of the impacts study periods of more than fifty years during 
which the global economy may grow considerably and be radically transformed (Nordhaus 2008). 
Indeed,  a  better  understanding  of  the  long  run  trends  in  the  cost  to  and  value  of  environmental 
resources will be central to prescribing climate policies (Sterner and Persson 2008). Yet, perhaps, 
because the valuation of present and future external costs has been driven by policy recommendations, 
their valuation has drawn little from past long run experiences.  
So, while the EKC literature has tended to be backward-facing, learning from past empirical 
evidence,  studies  of  external  costs  have  been  looking  at  the  present  and  the  future.  This  paper 
proposes that there may be benefits from looking at the past trends in external costs. In doing so, the 
author hopes to provide a different perspective both on external costs and on the relationship between 
economic growth and its burden on the environment and society. Such a perspective may be useful for 
explaining economic behaviour related to energy use, anticipating future environmental damage and 
offering policy recommendations.   
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to begin to understand how external costs have 
changed through time. It could be seen as „a monetisation of the EKC‟. However, by estimating the 
external costs, it identifies market and government failures, and also helps to provide a more structural 
analysis of the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality.  
To do so, this paper focuses on one of the most important periods in the history of energy, 
the  expansion  of  coal  use  in  nineteenth  century  Britain,  which  fuelled  the  Second  Industrial 
Revolution. The story has been recounted before, either as an industry (Flinn 1984, Church 1986), as 
the diver of economic growth (Landes 1969, Allen 2009) and as a source of pollution (Brimblecombe 
1987, Mosley 2001, Clay and Troesken 2010). However, the trade-offs between private individuals 3 
 
and society have not been considered directly. Here, the results identify a case of very high external 
costs that raise questions about future trends in environmental damages.  
This paper is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief review of how external 
costs might be expected to trend. Then, estimates of the damages associated with coal production and 
consumption are presented. They focus exclusively on the rise and then decline in deaths from coal 
mining accidents and respiratory diseases, and especially from local air pollution. Afterwards, trends 
in the value of a statistical life and of a life year lost are explained. These provide the basis for the 
estimates of the external costs, and comparing them to trends in prices. The benefits and costs of coal 
production and consumption are compared, and the market and government failures discussed. The 
final section draws conclusions. 
 
2. Expected Trends in Total and Marginal External Costs  
This section discusses how external costs might be expected to vary through time. This can 
be broken down into two parts: the overall level of pollution through time and marginal external costs 
per unit of pollution. Here, the purpose is not to delve deeply into the theory of pollution and damage 
functions, but only to build a bridge between the theory and empirical evidence on external costs.  
The most basic assumption (known as the scale effect) is that a growth in population and 
economic activity leads to a greater use of resources and environmental damage (Meadows et al 
1972). The  extensive  EKC  literature  has  studied  the  relationship between  per  capita income  and 
environmental  damage,  and  proposes  that,  initially,  as  economies  grow,  they  do  impose  an 
increasingly large burden on the environment, but that, beyond a turning-point, they are able to grow 
while reducing their damage (Grossman and Krueger 1995, Panayotou 1997). The analysis of certain 
pollutants (e.g. sulphur dioxide) in certain countries does support tentatively the existence of this 
relationship (Selden and Song 1992, List and Gallet 1993, Dinda 2004). However, the existence of 
causal mechanisms has not been shown empirically, the statistical analyses have frequently been 
criticised and believing that the EKC is a formal relationship could be dangerous if it forms the basis 
for developing environmental policies (Stern 2004).  
One way to consider the trends in pollution is as the outcome of the changing dynamics of 
the demand for and the supply of environmental quality (Pearson 1994, Kolstad 2006). The supply 
includes factors that may worsen or improve the level of pollutant emissions and the ability of waste 
receptors to deal with these emissions. These factors may change either exogenously or endogenously. 
In the latter case, supply may adjust in response to signals by the demand – either directly to public 
demands or, most probably (given the tendency to free ride), indirectly through government policies, 
legislation and enforcement, which in some way reflect demands for environmental quality. As a tool 
for analysing the relationship between income and environmental damage, the explanations for (and 
against) the EKC can be placed within this structural model of supply and demand (Carson 2010).  4 
 
On the supply-side, first, economic development is associated with a shift from agriculture 
to heavy and then light industry, and possibly to commerce and services. Each of these sectors has 
different environmental damages – for instance, agrarian societies radically alter land use and natural 
habitats, while heavy industry requires intensive mining and heating (provided cheaply by fossil fuels) 
to transform materials (Mosley 2010). Second, for certain activities, such as those associated with 
energy use, there tend to be transitions in resources used (e.g. from biomass to coal to petroleum to 
gas). These transitions may also, coincidently, have a lower or higher impact on the environment 
(Fouquet  2010).  Third,  polluters  (whether  individual  agents,  cities  or  countries)  can  export  their 
emissions,  either  to  uninhabited  or  poorer  areas  and  countries;  this  is  a  broader  version  of  the 
„pollution  haven‟  hypothesis  (Cole  2004).  These  last  two  factors  can  be  seen  as  the  result  of 
exogenous forces (such as energy transitions or the introduction of a free trade agreement) or in 
response to environmental concerns and legislation. Fourth, as more „cleaner‟ technology is produced 
and used, unit costs may fall. If increasing returns to scale do exist, wealthier countries, because of 
greater  investment  in  pollution  abatement,  can  reduce  emissions  more  cheaply  (Andreoni  and 
Levinson 2001). It also suggests that, at the same stage of economic development, current developing 
economies  might  also  have  access  to  cheaper  abatement  technologies  than  today‟s  developed 
economies.  
On the demand-side, first, as income rises, households have more time and money to be 
concerned about the environment – that is, there is a „positive‟ income elasticity for the environment. 
Second,  although  there  is  limited  evidence  of  this,  as  income  rises,  households  may  be  more 
concerned  and  interested  in  the  environment  –  a  „greater  than  one‟  income  elasticity  for  the 
environment (Dorfman 1977). Third, possibly helping to justify that last statement, communities with 
higher  incomes  tend  to  have  a  greater  awareness,  information,  education  and  knowledge  of 
environmental  pollution,  risks  and  hazards.  This  often  drives  the  introduction  of  more  stringent 
environmental  legislation  (Dasgupta  et  al  2002,  Kahn  2002).  Fourth,  more  open  and  democratic 
political systems should be more willing to reflect the concerns and sufferings of the public (López 
and Mitra 2000).  
So, factors may exist which shift the demand and supply towards generating a pollution 
outcome that follows an inverse-U path. On the other hand, if those factors do not prevail (e.g. global 
pollutants, which imply that exporting does not dissipate the problem (Kolstad 2006); decreasing 
returns to scale in abatement technology (Andreoni and Levinson 2001); low income elasticities for 
environmental  quality  (Kristrom  and  Riera  1996,  McConnell  1997);  or  governments  have  other 
priorities (López  and Mitra  2000)), it is  possible  that  trends  in  environmental  damage  may  only 
stabilise or continue to rise with income levels (Dagsupta et al 2002, Stern 2004). In other words, the 
pressures  on,  interactions  between  and  rigidities  associated  with  the  demand  for  and  supply  of 
environmental quality are still poorly understood and deserve more research (Carson 2010). 5 
 
Having looked at trends in pollution, it is now necessary to look at the cost of each unit of 
pollution.  To  date,  there  has  been  little  theoretical  discussion.  The  only  clue  is  related  to  the 
assumption about the damage function (Baumol and Oates 1988). If each unit of additional pollution 
causes more damage, then if pollution rises, then marginal and average external costs will tend to 
increase also. An explanation for this is that, at low levels of pollution, nature can assimilate pollution 
easily,  but,  as  levels  rise,  natural  waste  assimilation  services  struggle  to  keep  up  and  impose 
increasing damage for each unit. This might be especially relevant when flows of pollution create a 
stock or concentration of the pollutant, which determines the level of damage. It could be expected to 
occur both at the level of the environment (land, water, air or atmosphere) and individual bodies, 
where a person´s health system becomes increasingly unable to deal with greater quantities of toxins, 
and suffers more from each additional quantity.  
Yet, whether the marginal external costs are declining, constant or rising is, for now, an 
empirical question. If they increase at a constant rate, then examining external costs tells us little new. 
However, if they increase more than proportionally, studies focussing on pollution (such as the EKC 
literature) rather pollution costs underestimate the burden imposed on the wider society, as markets 
expand. Also, given that marginal external costs are likely to reflect the public´s willingness to pay to 
reduce emissions, it also helps us to identify the demand for improvements in environmental quality. 
Thus,  this  process  begins  to  provide  a  more  structural  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
environmental pollution and economic growth. 
 
3. The Expansion of the British Coal Industry and Consumption 
 
Having looked at how external costs might be expected to vary through time, this paper will 
investigate this trend empirically by using the case of the coal expansion in Britain in the nineteenth 
century. It will try to identify how total and marginal (or average) external costs have varied through 
time in past energy markets.  
Before examining external costs, though, it is worth briefly remembering the changes that 
took place to coal markets in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The coal mining 
industry expanded spectacularly, across regions in Britain and by exploiting deeper seams (Jevons 
1865, Hatcher 1993, Flinn 1984, Church 1987). The latter was in large part due to the use of the steam 
engine for pumping-up water. The industry also benefitted from a rapidly growing labour force. In 
addition,  by  the  1830s,  railways  were  able  to  distribute  coal  across  the  nation  more  effectively. 
Although cities like London continued to be supplied by waterway, average prices nearly halved 
between  1820  and  1850  (see  Figure  1).  Afterwards,  prices  stayed  relatively  constant,  with  some 
volatility. A growing population and industrial base pushed forwards demand. Growing demand and 
declining prices led to a rapid increase in coal consumption – rising from 20 million tonnes in 1820 to 6 
 
160 million tonnes in 1900. After 1913, coal consumption slumped, because of economic activity, 
restructuring and shifts to other energy sources. The decline of British coal, as an industry and as a 
source  of  energy,  is  a  complicated  mix  of  market  restructuring,  international  competition,  more 
valuable substitutes and environmental legislation (for details, see Ashworth 1986).    
 





Source: Fouquet (2008)    
 
While the increase in the nineteenth century was pivotal to Britain´s economic supremacy at 
the time, it also imposed high costs on its wider society. This paper will focus on deaths associated 
with  coal  production and consumption in the  United  Kingdom  between  1700  and  2000,  with  an 
emphasis on the period from 1850 to 1920. To achieve the objectives of the paper, the methodology 
used is relatively simplistic and does not take account of many of the external costs of coal
3. Thus, 
this paper provides only a broad indicator of the trend in associated external costs. 
 
4. Mortality associated with Coal Mining 
The two main sources of mortality associated with coal mining were accidents and lung 
diseases, particularly pneumoconiosis (McIvor and Johnston 2007). For hundreds of years, collapsing 
                                                       
3 ExternE (1995) presents the full external costs of coal for a United Kingdom power station in the early 1990s. 7 
 
coal seams and fires underground have cast a dark shadow over mining communities across Britain. 
Annual deaths increased rapidly in the 1830s and 1840s following the industry´s growth (see Figure 
2). They peaked at the beginning of the twentieth century; 1,753 miners perished in 1913, at a time 
when more than one million employed in coal production – roughly, 1 in 600 died that year. As 
employment declined, productivity increased and safety standards improved (Supple 1987), deaths 
caused by accidents declined rapidly. 
Pneumoconiosis was mainly connected with the dust resulting from the mechanisation of 
coal  extraction  and  appears  to  have  reached  its  peak  in  the  1960s  (McIvor  and  Johnston  2007). 
Interestingly,  these  two  sources  of  death  are  connected  since  mechanised  drilling  improved 
productivity, reducing the total number of workers and, so, accidental deaths, but also led to more 
respiratory problems. By the 1950s, pneumoconiosis deaths outnumbered accidental deaths by four to 
one.  
One question that arises in this study is whether miners´ deaths are costs that have been 
externalised. It could be argued that these greater risks are compensated for and internalised through 
higher wages. Given the rigidity of labour markets in coal mining towns and the social implications of 
losing family and community members, here, it is assumed that these deaths are external costs.   
 
5. The Rise in Mortality associated with Air Pollution  
The second external cost measured here are the deaths from local air pollution. Despite (no 
doubt) some lower rental prices to reflect neighbourhoods with higher air pollution concentrations, the 
lack of knowledge (both from residents and even the medical profession at the time) of the chronic 
impacts  of  air  pollution  (Brimblecombe  1987)  suggest  that  the  market  was  unlikely  to  properly 
internalise the costs of air pollution. So, these are also considered external costs. 
During  the  nineteenth  century,  London  and  other  British  cities  experienced  increasingly 
severe and frequent fogs, which caused trains to stop running, court cases to be abandoned and crime 
rates to soar. The fog was coal smoke, trapped on windless days in the winter, when homes needed 
extensive heating, and the fog shielded the warmth from the sun. In the late nineteenth century, 
London averaged 80 days of dense fog per year! In parts of the city, such as West Norwood, in 1885, 
more than 180 days were recorded as foggy (Clay and Troesken 2010 p.62). The economic costs to 
London, and other major cities, grinding to a halt due to the fog were very large, although difficult to 
quantify.  
A more measurable cost was the health damage. Respiratory diseases, especially associated 
with bronchitis, increased dramatically during and after foggy days. The average number of foggy 
days in London quadrupled from around 20 days in the 1820s and 1830s to 80 days in the 1880s and 
1890s (Clay and Troesken 2010 p.71).  8 
 
Pollution  concentration  in  London  grew  rapidly  during  that  period.  According  to 
Brimblecombe´s (1987) model and the coefficient for converting smoke to TSP (Total Suspended 
Particulates) presented in Maddison and Gaarder (2002 p.5), the concentration of TSP appears to have 
risen from just under 400μg/m3 (micro-grammes per cubic metre) around 1800 to 600μg/m3 in 1890 
(see Figure 3). For comparison, TSP concentrations in Delhi in the 1990s, one of the most polluted 
cities in the world, were around 370μg/m3 (Maddison and Gaarder 2002 p.10). 
 
Figure 3. Mortality Rate attributed to Bronchitis in London and England & Wales and Total 
Suspended Particulate (TSP) Concentration in London (1800-2000) 
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London  mortality  rates  associated  with  bronchitis  also  rose,  from  25  deaths  per  100,000 
inhabitants  per  year  in  1840  to  nearly  300  deaths  in  1890  – 1 person in 350 died that year from 
bronchitis. As Figure 3 indicates, death rates rose much faster than concentration from 1840 to 1880 
in London. This indicates that higher concentrations generate proportionally more deaths. This is 
equivalent  to  a  rising  marginal  external  cost,  as  consumption  increases,  or  marginal  benefits  of 
abatement, as pollution increases.  
One possible explanation for changes in death rates was a result of morticians´ certification: 
that is, from the 1840s, they began to increasingly diagnose deaths as due to bronchitis. Comparing 9 
 
the  estimated  air  pollution  concentration  and  mortality  rates  before  1850  and  after  1920,  more 
bronchitis  deaths  should  be  expected  before  1850.  Nevertheless,  it  is  unlikely  that  certification 
explains the dramatic increase in bronchitis deaths during the nineteenth century (Crofton 1965).  
Smoking may also explain some of the variation (Simpson 1962), particularly related to 
cigarette-smoking  rather  than  other  tobacco  consumption  (Christensen  1958).  However,  a  rapid 
increase  in  British  tobacco  consumption  and  cigarette-smoking  occurred  around  1890,  with  the 
improved mechanisation of cigarette production. Cigarette sales increased from 6.5 million in 1884 to 
313 million in 1893 (Hilton 2000 p.84) In other words, cigarette smoking fails to explain the increase 
in  bronchitis  during  most  of  the  nineteenth  century  and,  in  fact,  coincides  with  the  decline  in 
bronchitis mortality rates from the 1890s. Instead, urbanisation and pollution have generally been 
connected with the variations (Simpson 1962, Crofton 1965). 
Identifying which deaths are specifically due to air pollution is a difficult task. Given the 
data available, two avenues were possible to estimate deaths resulting from air pollution: identify the 
number of deaths caused by energy-related air pollution from those bronchitis deaths (which was used 
for the period 1850-1920) or use an exposure-response function (used for the periods before 1850 and 
after 1920). In the nineteenth century, air pollution seems to have been the main cause of bronchitis 
deaths, and the mortality statistics can be used to identify the damage caused by air pollution (Clay 
and Troesken 2010). Because of the apparent lack of other clear factors influencing nineteenth century 
bronchitis mortality and the rough estimate sought here, a simple approach was used for the period 
1850-1920. It was assumed that, in the absence of air pollution, and other factors, such as smoking, 
the mortality rate would be 10 deaths per 100,000 people - this rate was deducted from the actual rate. 
This value was chosen because, in 2000, the rate was 25 per 100,000 inhabitants with less (but some) 
pollution, and more cigarette smokers.  
By combining exposure-response functions (before 1850 and after 1920) and basic methods 
for attributing deaths due to air pollution (1850-1920) estimates suggest that the number of London 
bronchitis deaths due to air pollution increased from about 150 in 1700, to 500 in 1800, to 3,300 in 
1850. It also indicates that, in London and the rest of the country, deaths peaked in 1891, when nearly 
9,000 people died from bronchitis in the capital, and almost 72,000 perished in England and Wales.  
Because of the relatively low assumed base rate (of 10 deaths per 100,000 living), these 
numbers are similar to the total actual bronchitis deaths. Naturally, they may overstate bronchitis 
deaths due to air pollution, but the estimates ignore other respiratory deaths initiated by smoke and 






6. The Decline in Air Pollution Concentration and Mortality    
 
In the 1890s, the air pollution problem in London (and in other cities) was partially resolved, 
even though emissions did not decline. While still high by twenty-first century standards, air pollution 
concentration halved over the next fifty years, dropping below 300μg/m3 (see Figure 3).  
Clay and Troesken (2010 p.52) offer three explanations for the decline in fogs and pollution 
concentration. First, at the end of the nineteenth century, with the advent of commuter railways, 
population began to spread into more suburban and, so, to live less densely. During the second-half of 
the nineteenth century, there had been a desire for upper-middle class families to live away from the 
crime, sewage and smoke (Luckin 2000). The introduction of the Cheap Trains Act of 1883 and a 
rapid expansion of suburban housing in the 1890s allowed a larger proportion of the population to live 
in suburbs and commute into the city, leaving the poorest in the centres (Thompson 1982, Jackson 
2003, Burnett 1986). Thus, emissions were spread over a broader area. Although hard to pinpoint the 
exact timing of this spread quantitatively, the urbanised area of London increased five-fold between 
1841 and 1901, halving the population density, which then declined three-fold between 1901 and 
1951  (Demographia  2011).  In  addition  to  radically  changing  urban  life,  this  suburbanisation  of 
London and other cities in Britain was effectively a way of exporting the pollution.  
Second, with the introduction of the Public Health Act of 1891, businesses in London that 
produced excessive smoke could be fined. This would have put some pressure on businesses to ensure 
that their fires were properly stoked (although there was always an economic incentive to do so, as it 
improved  the  efficiency  of  combustion)  and  to  use  the  less  polluting  (but  twenty  percent  more 
expensive) Welsh (steam and anthracite) coal (Clay and Troesken 2010 p.48).  
A third explanation was that there was a possible shift towards gas for cooking and heating. 
Driven by the gas companies‟ initiatives to find new markets following competition from electricity in 
the lighting market, there was a rapid uptake of gas cookers during the 1890s and 1900s in London. 
The Gas Light & Coke Company, which supplied two-thirds of London customers, noted that in 1892 
only 2% of its customers had gas cookers and, by 1911, 69% had them (Goodall 1999 p.105). While 
gas cookers were competitive and cleaner, gas heating was still three times more expensive than coal 
(Fouquet 2008 p.85). Much of the coal household demand, especially on cold days when the heavy 
fogs occurred, was not for cooking but for heating. Indeed, total coal consumption (excluding the coal 
used for gas works) in London still increased by 12% from 1890 to 1910 (see, for instance, Clay and 
Troesken 2010 p.71) - implying that total emissions rose, as well. Given that much of the smoke 
problem  in  cities  was  associated  with  household  consumption  of coal for  heating,  the decline in 
population density (and the export of emissions) was probably the main explanation for the dramatic 
decline in air pollution concentrations.           11 
 
Mortality  rates  dropped  even  faster  than  concentrations  –  halving  in  twenty  years  (see 
Figure 3). By 1910, the number of air pollution-related bronchitis deaths dropped below 5,000 people 
in London and 30,000 in England and Wales.  
From 1920, air pollution concentrations fell further as a result of a gradual shift towards 
more efficient heating equipment, and better quality and less polluting fuels, such as anthracite coal, 
coke, town gas and electricity (Fouquet 2008). There were still events like the Big Smog of 1952, 
which was associated with many lost lives and spurred a new generation of environmental legislation 
(Brimblecombe  1987).  However,  by  the  mid-twentieth  century,  pea-soup  fogs  were  sporadic  and 
shocking events rather than part of everyday life. After 1960, and the enforcement of the Clean Air 
Act of 1956, which designated most urban areas as smokeless (Thorsheim 2006 p.113), pollution and 
respiratory diseases due to coal combustion declined further. For the second-half of the twentieth 
century, electricity generation was the main coal user and only a minor source of mortality.  
Taking account of the lower national mortality rate, but similar growth rates in pollution 
concentration across the country, these estimates were extrapolated for all of England and Wales: it 
rose from 2,400 in 1800, to more than 20,000 in 1850, to over 50,000 in 1900 and down to around 
12,000 in 1950 (see Table 1 for detail). Over these 300 years, an estimated 4.5 million people died as 
a result of coal production and consumption!     
 
Table 1. Estimates of Annual Deaths due to Coal Production and Consumption in the United 
Kingdom (1700-2000) 




Air Pollution  Total 
1700  2  Na  450  452 
1750  4  Na  980  984 
1800  38  Na  2,400  2,438 
1850  630  Na  20,250  20,880 
1900  1,450  200  50,450  51,900 
1950  500  800  12,125  13,425 
2000  0  0  136  136 







7. Long Run Trends in the Value of a Statistical Life and a Life Year Lost  
Having estimated the number of deaths, the next step is to place a value on them. This 
process is inevitably controversial (Cameron 2010). A common approach to placing an economic 
value  on  mortality  is  to  use  the  value  of  an  individual  „statistical‟  life  (VOSL).  For  the  United 
Kingdom, a number of studies offer ranges of estimates for the value of a statistical life. They range 
from a low-value estimate of £0.5 million for 1982 to a high-range estimate of £15.2 million in 1996 
(see Table 2). Given that here the objective is to use a single value per year, an average of the 
averages was taken. The average value for each statistical life lost in the United Kingdom for 2000 
was calculated to be £5.1 million. This is similar to Viscusi and Aldy´s (2003) range of $5.5–$7.5 
million for the US. The reader who would like to use a different value can adjust estimates, as the 
estimates are scalable (Murphy and Topel 2006).    
 
Table 2. A Selection of Values of a Statistical Life (£million) in the United Kingdom 
Study  Year  Average  Low  High 
Beattie et al. (1998)  1996  8.3  1.3  15.2 
Pearce and Cowards (1995)  1993  2.3     
Carthy et al (1999)  1997  4.6  4.0  5.2 
Jones-Lee et al(1983)  1982  5.4  0.5  10.2 
Avaerage    5.1     
Source: see table   
It has recently been shown that there is substantial heterogeneity in the value of a statistical 
life  (Viscusi  2010).  Age  differences  and  occupational  hazards  (Aldy  and  Viscusi  2007),  wage 
compensation  (Kniesner  et  al  2010),  existing  risk  level  (Viscusi  and  Aldy  2003)  and  culpability 
(Covey et al 2010) can influence the value.  
In the current study, though, these are premature deaths rather than fatalities that would be 
otherwise completely avoided. Amongst victims, there is considerable variation in the number of 
years lost due to premature death. For some, say elderly people whose deaths were accelerated due to 
respiratory problems aggravated by air pollution, only a few years may have been lost. On the other 
end, a young coal miner crushed under a fallen seam may have lived many decades further. Thus, a 
value of a life year lost (VOLY) approach is also being used (DEFRA 2007). This approach identifies 
the number of years prematurely lost and multiplies this number by the value of a life year lost 
(Murphy and Topel 2006, Aldy and Viscusi 2007). The VOLY used for United Kingdom air pollution 
studies is £29,000 per year lost (DEFRA 2007).  13 
 
This offers an indication of the value at the end of the twentieth century. However, this 
study is also interested in lives lost decades and centuries before. Following Murphy and Topel (2006 
p.891), a benefit transfer (Krupnick et al 1996, Smith et al 2006, Alberini et al 2008) on past years in 
the same country is used to estimate the value of past life years lost. The main variable influencing the 
value of past lives will be the current value of a life year lost and per capita income, using data from 
the Office for National Statistics (2010), Mitchell (1988) and Broadberry et al (2010).  
There are very few longitudinal studies of VOSL. The only one over a long period of time 
(Costa  and  Kahn  2004)  offers  an  interesting  example  for  the  US  between  1940  and  1980,  and 
indicates that the value of a statistical life rose at a faster rate than income during this period. Hammitt 
and Robinson (2011), although proposing that VOSL is a luxury good, show that the range of income 
elasticity estimates varies from 0.2 to 1.6. To take account of the views that willingness to pay for air 
pollution improvements probably does not vary proportionally with income (Krupnick et al 1996, 
Viscusi and Aldy 2003, Viscusi 2008) an income elasticity of 0.8 was used for the main values.  
 
Figure 4. Estimates of the Value of a Life Year Lost in England and Wales (1700-2000) 
Source: see text
VOLY: Income Elasticity of 0.8 
VOLY: Income Elasticity of 1 
 
 
From this, a series for the value of a life year lost was estimated back to the eighteenth 
century. Per capita income was roughly 90% lower in 1800 and 80% lower than in 2000; so, the value 14 
 
of  life  year  lost  (in  2000  money)  was  calculated  to  be  close  to  £8,120  (i.e.,  72%  lower:  90% 
multiplied by 0.8 for the income elasticity) in 1800 and £10,4400 (i.e., 64% lower: 80% multiplied by 
0.8 for the income elasticity) in 1900 (see Figure 4). To provide a comparison, the values assuming a 
unit income elasticity of demand (for avoiding mortality risks from air pollution) are also presented. 
Now, it is necessary to estimate the number of life years lost. Cropper et al (1997) highlight 
the different age distributions of air pollution-related deaths in developed and developing countries. In 
England and Wales, the ages at which people died from bronchitis changed substantially from 1850 to 
2000 (see Table 3). In 1850 and 1890, around 40% of the deaths were from under five year olds. This 
fell to 23% in 1910 and 0.1% in 2000. The share of over 65 year olds increased rapidly between 1890 
and 1910, and continued to increase through the twentieth century.   
 
Table 3. Age Distribution of Deaths from Bronchitis in England and Wales (1850-2000) 
  Under 5  5-19  20-64  65 and over 
1850  39.2%  2.5%  36.1%  22.3% 
1890  42.9%  1.2%  29.1%  26.8% 
1910  23.7%  0.8%  14.1%  61.4% 
2000  0.1%  0.0%  13.7%  86.2% 
Source: Registrar General (1851 onwards) 
 
However, life expectancy was much shorter in the eighteenth or nineteenth century than in 
the late twentieth century. The life expectancy at birth (i.e. age zero) has been estimated from the mid-
sixteenth century in England (Wrigley and Schofield 1981). Average life expectancy (at birth) was 
found to be about 38 years old in 1700, dropping slightly in 1750, and rising again in 1800 to about 
40. It rose from 42 in 1850 to 49 in 1900, leaping to 60 in 1925 and 70 by 1950, and reaching about 
77 years old in 2000 (Cervellati and Sunde 2005).  
By combining the age distribution of deaths from bronchitis with a model of life expectancy, 
it was possible to estimate the average number of years lost per death resulting from bronchitis. The 
changes in the two variables somewhat cancelled each other out, such that, life years lost remained 
relatively constant over three centuries: it increased from 18 years in 1700 to 19 in 1800, to 20 in 
1900, and down to 15 in 2000.  
These estimates can then be multiplied with the value of a life year lost to estimate the value 
of the average life lost in a particular year: in 1800, the value of an average life lost (from bronchitis) 
is estimated (in 2000 money) to be £37,000 in 1800, £116,000 in 1900 and £428,000 in 2000 – far 
below the £5.1 million of a statistical life.  
  15 
 
8. Estimates of the Long Run Trends in the External Costs of Coal  
 
The next step was to estimate the value of the lives lost and convert them into a value per 
tonne of coal. Just like future events, it could be suggested that past events should be backward 
discounted to reflect current allocation preferences between the present and the past (Wolf 1970, Ray 
and Wang 2001, Caplin and Leahy 2004). However, here, estimations of external costs are not used to 
determine the present value of past events but to identify the cost to society (as well as the share of 
price to marginal social costs) at different moments in time.  
Figure 5 shows the trend in total external costs. Naturally, the trend during the nineteenth 
century follows the mortality rates associated with air pollution (see Figure 3), rising rapidly until the 
1880s.  It  peaked  in  1891,  when  air  pollution  from  coal  was  estimated  to  have  caused  close  to 
£(2000)17.5 billion in damage (black line in Figure 5). Close to 73,000 people were estimated to have 
died as a result of coal production and consumption. During the twentieth century, the trend also 
reflects the rapid decline in air pollution concentrations from the 1890s and in the mid-twentieth 
century. The famous Big Smog of 1952 was indeed a relatively mild affair compared with what had 
come before. 
Naturally, a critical factor is the value used. For a basic sensitivity analysis, the estimates 
generated using a VOLY with an income elasticity of 1 provides a low range value and a VOSL (also 
with an income elasticity of 1) presents a high-end estimate. They also peak in 1891, offering a range 
from £(2000)10 billion to £(2000)65 billion. To spread the range further and higher, the value of a 
statistical life could have been presented using an income elasticity of 0.8 or lower, and damages 
would been estimated to be more than £(2000)100 billion (following Krupnick et al (1996)). Now, for 
such long periods, a low income elasticity does produce questionable values of a life year lost (or a 
life). On the other hand, there are still doubts about the suitability of using the value of a life year lost, 
since the value of a statistical life probably does not change linearly with age (Alberini et al 2008). 
Also, this methodology has been recommended in a context (i.e. the twenty-first century) when the 
majority of the deaths were for aged people, with potentially few years left to live (DEFRA 2007). 
However, in the nineteenth century, more than 40% of deaths were under fives, potentially robbing 
them of their whole lives, even if they were relatively nasty, brutish and short. Taking these points 
into  account,  the  central  value  does  seem  like  an  appropriate  compromise,  and  does  provide  an 
indicator of the rise in total and average external costs.  
To provide some additional perspective, Figure 5 also presents consumer expenditure on 
coal. This acts as an indicator of the welfare value associated with coal consumption. The appropriate 
indicator is the marginal consumer surplus (not price) multiplied by consumption, but this is not 
possible to estimate here. Between 1870 and 1895, consumer expenditure was about two-thirds of the 
total external costs. In other words, during this period, the total consumer surplus would have had to 16 
 
have been fifty percent higher than consumer expenditure to have matched the total external costs, 
and to have provided society with positive utility from this level of consumption. Effectively, coal 
consumption was probably far higher than was socially desirable. 
 
Figure 5. Range of Estimates of Total External Costs Associated with Coal Production and 
Consumption (in Comparison with Coal Expenditure) in England and Wales (1700-2000)  
Coal 
Expenditure  Total External Costs           
(VOLY: Income Elasticity: 0.8) 
Total External Costs 
(VOSL) 
Source: See text 
Total External Costs           
(VOLY: Income Elasticity: 1) 
 
 
Also, as an indicator of the scale of damage, total external cost can be compared with GDP. 
In 1820, the total damage was estimated to be equivalent to 4% of GDP. This reached 9% in 1850. It 
ranged from 15% to 20% of GDP between 1870 and 1890, peaking in 1879. In 1891, the damages 
were estimated to be 17.3%, at a time when the GDP was £(2000)100 billion . By 1950, the damage 
had fallen to 2% of GDP.   
The final step was to convert total external costs into unit costs. For theoretical purposes 
marginal costs are sought; however, they are impossible to estimate in this case. Instead, average 
external costs (i.e. total external costs divided by total primary coal consumption) can be calculated. 
They provide a clear indication of the marginal values: when average external costs rise, marginal 
costs have risen further; when averages fall, marginal values have fallen further.   17 
 
Figure 6 presents the trend in the price of coal and average external costs, along with the 
percentage in the average social costs (i.e., the sum of the marginal private costs (here, proxied by the 
price) and marginal external costs). The first observation is that in the eighteenth century average 
external costs were already significant. The introduction and adoption of chimneys across Britain 
allowed dwellings to use coal and eject the smoke, thus, not suffer their unpleasant consequences 
(Fouquet 2008). At that time, external costs were estimated to be responsible for around 20-25% of 
the social costs of energy production and consumption. 
 
Figure 6. The Price of Coal, Average External Cost, and the Percentage of the Average External 








Source: See text  * Five-Year Average   
 
The second point is that when prices fell between 1820 and 1850, along with a rise in 
demand associated with a growing population and economy, consumption soared (see Figure 1), and 
so did average and marginal external costs . From the mid-1870s to the early-1890s, these external 
costs  were  estimated  to  be  60-70%  of  the  social  costs  (see  Figure  6).  Thus,  consumers  were 
benefitting from cheap coal, but society as a whole was paying twice as much (for each tonne of coal 
consumed).    18 
 
 
9. Market and Government Failures  
 
The estimates indicate that the marginal social costs far outweighed the marginal social 
benefits of consuming coal. In 1850, the marginal (i.e. the final or 60 millionth) tonne consumed was 
valued at the price (i.e. £(2000)55). But, the average external cost at the time was £(2000)62. Given 
that the evidence suggests that the external costs rose more than proportionally with pollution, the 
marginal external costs must have been far greater. So, society in 1850 was suffering far more than 
£(2000)62 for a tonne of coal that was only valued at £(2000)55. And, this marginal cost-benefit 
analysis worsened after 1850. No doubt, many millions of tonnes of coal were consumed that imposed 
far more damage than benefit. To work out the optimal level of coal consumption would require 
knowledge  of  the  consumer  surplus  (the  demand  curve  or  the  marginal  private  benefits  of 
consumption) and the marginal external cost curve (not just the average costs). But, given that prices 
(and marginal benefits of consumption) remained relatively stable afterwards, by 1850, it was socially 
sub-optimal  for  marginal  and  average  external  costs  to  be  rising  further.  The  nineteenth  century 
British coal consumption was a clear example of market failure.  
Had households been taxed to pay the full social costs, it is questionable how much coal 
would have been consumed in nineteenth century Britain. Households may have been colder, or they 
may have insulated their homes more effectively, used more efficient stoves rather than fireplaces and 
used less polluting fuels. But, in the early 1800s, when average external costs were beginning to 
escalate, or throughout the nineteenth century, when pollution abatement societies were being formed 
to put pressure on the authorities, blinding fogs and respiratory diseases had often been accepted as 
the price to pay for wealth and warmth (Brimblecombe 1987, Mosley 2001).  
Yet, factors were in place by the 1850s to resolve the problem: businesses knew that good 
stoking was the key to both using coal efficiently and reducing smoke emissions (Thorsheim 2006 
p.18); Continental and Scandinavian homes had used far more efficient stoves for heating at least 
since the eighteenth century (Fouquet 2008 p.79); gas cookers began being used in the 1840s, and 
there was extensive gas supplies in all towns across the country (Goodall 1999 pp.24-9); there were 
other  smokeless  fuels,  such  as  anthracite  coal  (available  in  the  South  West  of  Wales)  and  coke 
(produced  by  carbonising  the  coal  first),  that  could  have  been  used  by  households  for  heating 
purposes (Jevons 1865 p.156); and, railroads could have expanded the limits of the city, spreading the 
air pollution and reducing concentration (Jackson 2003). So, opportunities for mitigation existed.  
Naturally, mitigation would have imposed substantial costs. The factors that enabled air 
pollution concentrations to decline at the end of the nineteenth century had benefitted from several 
additional decades of development (particularly, in the railway, gas and coke industries) to achieve 
economies of scale and lower prices (Fouquet 2011). Therefore, mitigation in the 1850s, say, rather 19 
 
than the 1890s would have been substantially more expensive. Although very difficult to estimate 
(and requiring an extensive counterfactual study), it is questionable whether these costs would have 
amounted to 15-20% of GDP, as the external costs did.   
The barriers to addressing the problem appear to have been a perception of the risk and 
government failures. Possibly encouraged by industrialists fearing environmental legislation, there 
were many dissenters that questioned the harmfulness of air pollution. It was only in the 1880s that 
the widespread belief that smoke actually cleansed the air of impurities (known as the miasma theory) 
was rejected, and a consensus formed about the health damage caused by smoke (Thorsheim 2006 
p.195).  
Despite dissenters and uncertainties about the dangers of smoke, from the 1860s, pressure 
groups,  such  as  the  Smoke  Abatement  Societies,  tried  to  influence  environmental  legislation. 
Numerous scientists tried unsuccessfully to incorporate coal smoke into the Alkali Act of 1863. The 
Sanitary Act of 1866 finally required (rather than allowed) municipal officials to prosecute owners of 
smoky businesses. However, loopholes (related to wording of the act) and exemptions implied it was 
not enforced. Similarly, the Public Health Act of 1875 (which did not apply to London) stated that 
smoke nuisances should be reduced “as far as practicable”, and leniency was common. The Public 
Health (London) Act of 1891 introduced equally weak and lenient legislation to the capital, only 
addressing certain businesses and not households, which were the main culprits (Thorsheim 2006 
pp.113-5).  
Perhaps  because  pollution  concentrations  began  to  improve,  and  marginal  and  average 
external  costs  did  fall  (fifty  years  later  than  was  probably  optimal),  environmental  legislation 
remained toothless. Nevertheless, until the middle of the twentieth century, average external costs 
remained close to the price (i.e. the marginal benefits of consumption). In 1956, when British primary 
coal  consumption  actually  peaked,  an  estimated  one-third  of  the  social  cost  was  still  being 
externalised. Average external costs fell dramatically with the enforcement of the Clean Air Act of 
1956. This legislation, in addition to formally stating emission levels for firms, finally addressed the 
burden that household coal consumption had been imposing on society for centuries, by specifying 
that urban areas were to be smokeless zones (Thorshiem 2006 p.113). Thus, stringent environmental 
legislation on smoke emissions was introduced more than one hundred years after it was probably 
optimal to have done so. As a result, while coal is still responsible for many other external costs, 










A Historical Trend in External Costs 
The purpose of this paper was to begin to investigate how external costs have changed 
through time. To do so, this paper investigated a major period in energy history, nineteenth century 
Britain, often associated with the fuelling of the Second Industrial Revolution (Church 1986, Allen 
2009).  During  the  nineteenth  century,  the  rapid  growth  in  urban  population  and  income  levels, 
coupled with a decline in coal prices, led to soaring coal consumption and deadly fogs in the cities.  
To place an economic cost on those deaths, simple valuation techniques based on the value 
of a life year lost (and the value of a statistical life for comparison) were used. The central value 
estimated that, at its peak, in 1891, this was equivalent to £(2000)17.5 billion in damage, at a time 
when Britain´s GDP was £(2000)100 billion. The proportion of average social costs of coal that was 
externalised  increased  from  around  20-30%  before  1820  to  two-thirds  between  1870-1890,  then 
falling to 40-50% in the first half of the twentieth century, and then declining rapidly after 1960.  
The  estimates  of  external  costs  are  not  meant  to  be  accurate.  The  paper  ignored  many 
external costs (ExternE 1995), including land subsidence, contamination of water systems, disruptions 
to daily life and economic activity, rising crime rates, degradation of buildings, reduction of crop 
yields, ecosystem loss and degradation, and climate change. Also, the method for estimating the 
number of deaths (particularly related to air pollution) was crude. In addition, the approach to valuing 
the loss of life was basic. There is considerable debate about the income elasticity of the value of a 
life  (Krupnick  et  al  1996,  Costa  and Kahn  2004,  Hammit  and  Robinson  2011,  Jones  2011).  An 
alternative  approach,  but  fraught  with  complexities  (due  to  market  failures  in the labour  market, 
unionisation, skills, safety legislation, insurance coverage changes and regional variations in wage 
rates (Hinterman et al 2010)), would have been to estimate the value of a life based on the wage 
differential for jobs with greater risk of mortality (Costa and Kahn 2004). Thus, this paper offers only 
an indication of trends in historical external costs.  
 
The Dynamics of the Demand for and Supply of Environmental Quality 
The trend in total and average external costs can be seen as a reflection of the shifts in the 
demand for and supply of air quality, and the rigidities in supply responding to demand. A decline in 
the supply of air quality (due to the growth in urban coal consumption) during the nineteenth century, 
coupled with a rising marginal damage function, increased the related external costs and the demand 
for air quality improvements. Supply failed to respond, because of the lack of incentives to reduce 
emissions.  
By comparing the average external costs with the average benefits of consumption (using 
price as a proxy), it suggests that, certainly by 1850, British coal consumption was socially sub-21 
 
optimal  (i.e.,  too  high).  Government  needed  to  intervene  and  influence  supply.  However,  in  the 
second-half of the nineteenth century, despite the availability of solutions to reduce emissions and 
concentrations, demands to regulate were met with weak legislation (which failed to address the main 
culprits, households) and limited enforcement. Thus, government failed to provide genuine incentives.  
In one sense, exogenous factors (particularly suburban development) were responsible for 
the air quality improvements at the end of the nineteenth century. In another, changes in the housing 
market  reflected  a  delayed  market  reaction  to  many  urban  problems  of  the  time,  such  as  crime, 
sewage and smoke, which had not been properly addressed by markets directly related to these issues 
or government (Burnett 1986). Therefore, these failures left it to society, through the housing market, 
to adapt. It did, very slowly, and at a very high cost to society, with the poorest suffering the most.  
As Carson proposed (2010), this paper concurs that, analysing the dynamics of, interactions 
between and rigidities in the demand for and supply of environmental quality can help to understand 
the  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  environmental  quality.  It  also  suggests  that  often 
environmental legislation does require extreme situations to intensify the pressure on government to 
introduce bills associated with the environment – and, therefore, act as a conduit between the demand 
and supply. However, government may not necessarily address the main causes, receive the support 
needed in parliament or enforce legislation once introduced (Kahn 2007). Consequently, the market 
and government often leaves the outcome of environmental problems to a mix of poorly understood 
partially exogenous and partially endogenous forces.   
 
Lessons for the Growth in Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
One should be very cautious about using a historical experience to draw conclusions about 
another environmental problem. This is especially true since, first, air pollution is a local problem and 
climate change is a global one, and, second, greenhouse gases are stock pollutants, where as air 
pollution is a problem of flow. Although it is only one case study, reflecting its particular physical, 
technological, economic, social, political and cultural characteristics, it can provide a cautionary tale.  
In particular, greenhouse gas emissions and concentrations have increased rapidly over the 
last fifty years, a demand does exist for greenhouse gas mitigation, mitigation solutions do exist (even 
if some are costly), polluters have little incentive to reduce emissions, the damage function related to 
climate change is likely to rise with increasing concentrations, dissenters do question the science, and 
legislation has tended to be weak and enforced with difficulty. This suggests that, regarding climate 
stability, supply is shifting to the left, demand is shifting to the right, and, if a price (i.e., where 
demand and supply met) for climate stability existed, it would be rising sharply. However, demand 
and supply do not meet in an equilibrium, and governments need to be the conduit between demand 
and supply.  
Based on the historical experience studied in this paper, it may require very high external 
costs and long delays before governments act as a conduit, especially since the main polluters are 22 
 
consumers, citizens and voters. It is probable that supply and demand will adjust and adapt, but only 
very slowly. In the meantime, most anticipate that the supply of climate stability will shift further to 
the left (as global populations and incomes rise) and demand may shift more to the right (especially if 
weather  systems  become  exponentially  more  damaging  with  concentrations  (Weitzman  2009)), 
imposing a high cost to society with, again, the poorest suffering most.  
 
Future Research 
Three  lines  of  investigation  follow  from  this  paper.  The  first  is  a  better  theoretical 
understanding of the dynamics of the demand for and supply of environmental quality (including the 
market  and  government  failures)  influencing  the  relationship  between  economic  growth  and 
environmental quality. The second is to provide additional empirical evidence to indicate whether the 
case studied here was an extreme and exceptional case. It is important to understand whether such 
dramatic increases in average external costs have occurred in other contexts and whether it is likely to 
be imposed again.  
Third,  researchers  need  to  explore  the  appropriate  policies  as  external  costs  change  in 
periods of rapid economic growth. Just like in nineteenth century Britain, identifying the desired 
balance between wealth and health is difficult and politically sensitive. Similarly, how governments 
should act to improve the situation is unclear. For instance, the principle of internalising the external 
costs  of  energy  use  has  generally  focused  on  correcting  (e.g.  taxing  or  creating  trading  permits) 
relatively  small  shares  of  the  social  costs  (Nordhaus  2007).  While  market-based  instruments  are 
flexible in principle, major increases in carbon taxes or large reductions in the supply of tradable 
permits  are  politically  unacceptable.  Thus,  economists  may  need  to  think  about  how  to  develop 
instruments that can genuinely adjust to dramatic increases in external costs.   
But, what happens in extreme cases, when the external costs are several times the price? 
Weitzman (2009) highlights the risks of very high external costs associated with energy use. While 
many may discard these as low-risk events, an awareness that the burden from energy consumption on 
the wider society has been very high in the past and can get much worse may help concentrate minds 
a little more towards finding solutions, and not simply accepting that climate change is the price to 
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